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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates the sociographic history of HIV/AIDS in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region1 in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Xinjiang is 
China’s largest province and it is located in north-west China. It is home to a 
number of different minority nationalities as well as increasing numbers of Han 
Chinese migrants to the region. Xinjiang is also home to a serious HIV/AIDS 
epidemic and was one of the first areas to be significantly affected by HIV in 
China. The serious nature of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Xinjiang, combined with 
growing concerns by Xinjiang locals that the Chinese government is not doing 
enough to combat HIV/AIDS among minority nationalities in the region, has the 
potential to increase regional tensions and provide further fuel to the tinder box 
that is ethnic relations in Xinjiang. While for the most part, tensions in the region 
have been focused around separatism and minority rights, HIV/AIDS poses an 
enormous threat to security within the region due to its ability to strip economic 
gains and reverse social developments made there over the past few decades and 
its potential to exact a huge toll in human life. Xinjiang is an important region for 
China due to both its wealth of natural resources and its strategic capacity as a 
buffer region between the PRC and Central Asian states. However, an ever-
burgeoning HIV/AIDS pandemic in the region threatens to destabilise China's 
grand plan for this north-western province if its HIV/AIDS epidemic continues to 
grow. 
 
Keywords: HIV/AIDS, Uyghurs, minority nationalities, Han Chinese, ethnic 
relations  
                                                           
∗
 Anna Hayes is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations in the Faculty of Arts at the University of 
Southern Queensland, Australia. She specialises in human security and pandemic illnesses such as 
HIV/AIDS and has published on the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the People's Republic of China. She is co-
editor of two forthcoming books: Migration and Insecurity: Citizenship and Social Inclusion in a 
Transnational Era (Routledge, 2012) with Niklaus Steiner and Robert Mason and Cultures in Refuge: 
Seeking Sanctuary in Modern Australia (Ashgate, 2012) with Devleena Ghosh and Robert Mason.   
1
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INTRODUCTION 
At the end of 2009, it was estimated there were 740,000 people living with 
HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) in the PRC (Ministry of Health of the People's 
Republic of China 2010: 5). Although the Chinese government reported that 
the epidemic in China was slowing and the national prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS there has remained low at approximately 0.057% by the close of 
2009 (Li et al. 2010: ii66), it also stated that HIV transmission was 
diversifying and sexual transmission had become the primary transmission 
mode (Ministry of Health of the People's Republic of China 2010: 5). 
Sexual transmission of HIV increases the likelihood of HIV/AIDS spreading 
rapidly through the general population. Therefore, although national figures 
on HIV/AIDS for China appear to be steady, these numbers could rise quite 
fast if China experiences a growth period of HIV transmission among the 
general population. The hardest hit provinces in China are Yunnan, 
Guangxi, Henan, Sichuan, Guangdong as well as the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region. It has been estimated that they account for 
approximately 70–80% of China's total reported HIV/AIDS cases (ibid). 
These provincial statistics demonstrate that some regions of China are 
experiencing characteristics of epidemic growth among the general 
population. In Xinjiang, there is a significant HIV/AIDS epidemic among 
traditional high-risk groups such as injecting drug users (IDUs) and 
commercial sex workers (CSWs), as well as sections of its general 
population. Xinjiang is the PRC's largest administrative district and it is 
located in north-west China. The total number of people living with 
HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) in Xinjiang is officially estimated to be in the vicinity 
of around 60,000 (Gill and Gang 2006; Tianshan Net 2010; Xinjiang Bureau 
of Health HIV/AIDS Control Office 2010). Furthermore, Xinjiang is home 
to almost 10% of the total HIV infections in China, even though its 
population only accounts for approximately 1% of China's overall 
population (ibid). According to Tianshan Net (2010), Xinjiang "has the 
fastest spread of the disease [HIV/AIDS] in China." Therefore, it is 
important that the HIV/AIDS epidemic there be given considered attention 
and research focus. This paper examines the HIV/AIDS epidemic in 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and considers how the sociographic 
history of Xinjiang is intertwined with both its burgeoning epidemic and 
Chinese government responses to the epidemic. 
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BACKGROUND: ETHNIC RELATIONS AND REGIONAL 
"AUTONOMY"  
Xinjiang has a diverse minority nationality (shaoshu minzu) population and 
is home to Uyghurs, Huis, Mongolians, Kazakhs, Xibos, Kirgiz, Uzbeks, 
Manchus, Tatars, Tajiks, Daghurs and Russians, along with other minority 
groups who have recently been migrating to the region (Tianshan Net 2007).  
Its total population numbers in the vicinity of 20.5 million, of whom 60.3% 
belong to the minority nationalities (Statistical Bureau of Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region 2007). The Uyghurs have long been the region's 
majority population and they number in the vicinity of 9.5 million. They 
account for nearly 46% of the region's total population. However, their 
majority status within the region is changing due to continued Han Chinese 
migration to the area.2 The Han population recently reached 8.12 million 
and they now account for approximately 39.7% of the overall population in 
Xinjiang (Tianshan Net 2007).  
Government programs, as well as private economic motivations, have 
encouraged Han Chinese to migrate to Xinjiang. Their presence and 
influence has caused a "Sinicisation" of the region. This Sinicisation has not 
gone unnoticed by the region's minority nationalities, many of whom 
resentfully regard the migrants as competition for jobs and thus as 
competition for the enjoyment of economic prosperity within the region. 
Mackerras (2004) states that some Uyghurs regard Han migrants to the 
region as "foreign overlords who take land and jobs from local people." 
However, this is not a view applied to all Han migrants. Those who 
migrated to the region in the 1950s and 1960s are often less resented 
because they are seen to be more sympathetic to Uyghurs and to have 
demonstrated their loyalty to Xinjiang. This differentiation is partly to do 
with the large numbers of migrant workers who travel to Xinjiang each year 
with the sole aim of making money to remit back home. This is seen as a 
significant drain on the region's economy and long-term prosperity. 
It is also perceived that Han Chinese migrants are taking jobs that 
could be filled by Uyghurs and other minority nationalities. If we consider 
government, party and social security sectors this is an accurate conclusion 
to draw. Han Chinese workers account for 59% of the employees in these 
sectors (Iredale et al. 2001: 169). In prospecting and geological surveying 
they account for 88% of the workforce, in the scientific fields the percentage 
is 85.2%, in health and hygiene it is 66% and in the real estate market 
                                                           
2
 In 1949, Uyghurs accounted for 76% of Xinjiang's population. By 1964, this figure had dropped to 55%, 
it was 46% in 1986, returning to 47% by 1990 (He and Guo 2000: 147). This demonstrates that Han 
migration to the region has had a significant impact on the ethnic ratios in Xinjiang. In 1949, Han 
Chinese constituted only 6.7% of the population in Xinjiang. By 1990, this figure had risen to 37.6% 
(Iredale et al. 2001: 166).  
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70.4% of employees are Han Chinese (ibid). These figures indicate that the 
provision in Article 23 of The Law on Regional National Autonomy (1984) 
calling for the preferential hiring of minority nationalities in personnel 
recruitment has not been implemented (Mackerras 2003: 22). Han 
monopoly over these jobs is counterproductive for China, as it has 
contributed to a "divided society" where skilled employment is 
predominantly Han Chinese, with Uyghurs being most concentrated in 
agricultural employment (ibid). However, this monopoly has also led to 
minority nationality populations seeking out economic opportunities with 
their ethnic cohorts in the neighbouring Central Asian states. This serves to 
reinforce ethnic identities among Xinjiang's minority nationality 
populations, weakening their national identity as citizens of China (Liew 
2004). This in turn could reinforce separatist ambitions among more 
radicalised segments of society.   
In 2000, the Chinese government launched the Great Western 
Development Strategy (GWDS) (Xibu Da Kaifa Zhanlüe). The purpose of 
this policy was to improve living standards, infrastructure and ethnic 
relations. Thus far however, the GWDS has been focused on the 
development of urban areas (predominantly populated by the Han), not the 
countryside (predominantly populated by minority nationalities). This has 
caused an increasing disparity in wealth among Xinjiang's population based 
on location and ethnic identity, and the developmental and economic 
outcomes of this strategy have been unevenly distributed. More disturbing, 
however, is that this was able to occur despite the fact that the GWDS was 
introduced largely to improve conditions in the south-west areas of Xinjiang 
(Mackerras 2004). In addition, it has been difficult to determine whether or 
not the GWDS has minority nationality support. According to Iredale et al. 
(2001:195) "[m]inority autonomy may again be 'losing out' in the interest of 
the wider population policy and overall Chinese development," so this 
support could be unlikely in areas where minority nationalities feel they are 
'losing out' to Han Chinese. 
There are also disparities in the political and educational 
representation of minority nationalities. While at the primary and secondary 
school levels Uyghur children are generally well represented, there is a 
significant drop in the number of Uyghur enrolments between the secondary 
and tertiary sectors. Furthermore, since the 1990s there has been a 
noticeable decline in the numbers of Uyghurs in the tertiary sector 
(Mackerras 2004). This disparity also applies to political representation. 
According to Mackerras, it is common for Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
heads to be Han Chinese and government counterparts to be Uyghur. As a 
result, it is the Han who occupy the powerful political positions, meaning 
Uyghurs and other minority nationalities, may be missing out on having a 
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strong political influence in the CCP (Millward and Tursun 2004). 
Education and political representation are important factors in providing a 
"Uyghur voice," representing Uygur concerns in state affairs. Without such 
a voice it is likely the Uyghurs may feel increasingly marginalised and 
continued social and political unrest could result.    
Resentment is also fuelled because the Han migrants are believed to 
be serving a strategic government manoeuvre. Their presence in Xinjiang is 
regarded as an attempt by the CCP to ensure the region remains part of 
China by way of increasing the proportion of Han to non-Han in the 
population as a whole, thereby preventing attempts at secession by minority 
nationalities. Moreover, intermarriage is not common in the region and 
Mackerras (2004) found quite hostile attitudes among minority nationality 
populations toward intermarriage with Han Chinese. On the other side of the 
coin, there has also been some Han resentment towards Uyghurs who enjoy 
more favourable conditions under the One Child Policy. Uyghurs living in 
the countryside are permitted to have three children while urban couples 
may have two children; most Han Chinese couples are restricted to just one 
child per family. Therefore, the growth in Han Chinese numbers has been 
achieved primarily through sustained Han migration to Xinjiang.     
Lack of autonomy in what is purportedly an "Autonomous Region" is 
also counterproductive to China's goals of national unity. Mackerras (2004) 
has stated that many Uyghurs regard their current autonomy as "totally 
false" and desire greater autonomy and a reduced presence of the CCP. 
However, he also rightly warns that "autonomy" should not be confused 
with "independence" as that was not the purpose of the autonomous regions 
(Mackerras 2003: 22). Since Xinjiang became a province of Qing Dynasty 
China in 1884, there has been continuous rebellions and secession attempts 
(Clarke 2007).3 Ethnic relations in the region have been unstable, and during 
the more radical years under Mao Zedong, such as the Anti-Rightist Policy 
(1957), the Great Leap Forward (1958–61) and the Cultural Revolution 
(1966–76), the Uyghurs and other minority nationalities suffered significant 
hardship and cultural dislocation. The post-Mao era has also been marked 
by ethnic unrest in Xinjiang. The early 1980s were a turbulent time with 
separatist movements becoming involved in factional, anti-government 
conflict. Resistance to the government was swiftly countered however, and 
this again increased racial tension in the region (Van Wie Davis 2008; 
Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004; Clarke 2009; Mackerras 2009). There were 
                                                           
3
 Even the name "Xinjiang," which translates as New Dominion/Frontier, has been problematic. Many 
Uyghur nationalists have rejected the name and have drawn attention to its "colonial implications." For 
more information on this see Kamalov, Ablet. 2009. "Uyghurs in the Central Asian Republics: Past and 
Present," in China, Xinjiang and Central Asia: History, Transition and Crossborder Interaction into the 
21st Century, ed. Mackerras, C. and Clarke, M. (London: Routledge), 115–132.  
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also conflicts between local groups and Han migrants (Mackerras 2003; 
Dillon 2004). 
The summers of 1996 and 1997 saw heightened periods of ethnic 
unrest, largely a reaction to the regional CCP focus on eliminating 
separatism in Xinjiang as part of the nationwide "Strike Hard" campaign 
(Gladney 2004; Dillon 2004).4 In Ürümqi, there were attacks on law 
enforcement officers and symbols of Chinese authority. Countless Uyghurs 
were arrested and executed on charges of suspicion of separatism, with 
schools and mosques considered "illegal" closed down and banned 
publications destroyed (Dillon 2004). This instability has continued to the 
present day and it has intensified from time to time.  
One of the more recent examples of ethnic clash in the region was the 
July 2009 race riots in Ürümqi. These race riots reportedly saw 197 people 
lost their lives in the violence, 1,600 people were injured and 1,434 people 
were detained (Lewis 2009). The race riots are testament to continued 
instability and ethnic tension in the region. This bout of violence was 
reportedly attributed to the deaths of two Uyghur factory workers in 
southern China and it led to widespread protests and violence to erupt across 
Xinjiang (ibid.). In 2011, further violence broke out on the anniversary of 
this event in Kashgar and Khotan, when Uyghur groups launched separate 
attacks in the two cities. One of the reasons given for the violence was the 
detention, without trial, of many young Uyghur men after the anniversary of 
the 2009 riots. In addition, tensions were also heightened by the 
government's destruction of traditional Uyghur houses in Kashgar. The 
demolition of these houses, labelled "unsafe" and "unsanitary" by Beijing, is 
viewed by the Uyghurs as both cultural destruction and an attempt by 
Beijing to "to break up their communities and reduce their influence in the 
city" (Dillon 2011). The treatment of minority nationalities during these 
recurrent periods of unrest has further increased Uyghur resentment against 
Chinese rule (Zhao 2001). These factors have all served increasingly to 
marginalise minority nationalities within the region. 
Ethnic unrest in the region is swiftly countered by the Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps (Bingtuan) (XPCC), as well as by units 
of the PLA and/or police. The former force numbers around 2.54 million 
troops as of 2004 (Kerr and Swinton 2008) and they constitute a significant 
proportion of Han migrants to Xinjiang (although their numbers were not 
included in the aforementioned breakdown of Xinjiang's population). The 
XPCC has a dual role in Xinjiang, best articulated by Zhang Qinli, who was 
XPCC commander in 2004. He stated "[i]n peacetime the farming role 
becomes more important, and in times of tension the security role is more 
important. These two roles are inseparable" (cited in Kerr and Swinton 
                                                           
4
 The "Strike Hard" campaign is discussed in more depth in later sections of this article.  
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2004: 120). The presence of XPCC in Xinjiang ensures that separatism is 
not achievable, while their farming role sees them "opening up the west" for 
Han economic gain, as part of the aforementioned GWDS.  
The XPCC is also of interest to this paper because they are already 
showing HIV prevalence rates that are higher than those present among 
China's general population. During the period 2003–2005, HIV prevalence 
among this force was approximately 0.28% (Li et al. 2008). However, high 
prevalence rates throughout Xinjiang are likely to increase prevalence rates 
among the XPCC as well. Worldwide, armed forces are considered a high 
risk group for HIV vulnerability due to their mobility and inclination for 
risk taking behaviours such as IDU and engaging in commercial sexual 
exchange (Feldbaum et al. 2006). Therefore, if rates of HIV among the 
XPCC increase, Beijing should be very concerned as it could lead to a 
destabilisation of the very force Beijing has charged with maintaining 
stability within Xinjiang.   
 
SOCIOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS OF THE HIV/AIDS 
EPIDEMIC AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSES 
There have been considerable problems with Xinjiang's HIV/AIDS 
response. There was a problematic lack of political will and effort to contain 
Xinjiang's HIV/AIDS epidemic in the early days, and it has only been in 
recent years that Beijing has introduced nationwide HIV/AIDS responses 
that fall into line with international best practice. Rudelson (2003) rightly 
states that up until 2002, the Chinese government regarded HIV/AIDS in 
Xinjiang as a "Uyghur disease." Based solely upon infection rates, this may 
have been a logical conclusion as 85% of those infected with HIV in 
Xinjiang were from the Uyghur nationality (ibid.). However, this was very 
similar to how Beijing viewed Yunnan's epidemic, which was also regarded 
as a minority problem. Hood reports that photographs of local cases of 
HIV/AIDS in China included in medical pictorials were of non-Han 
minority people. This fact was obvious in the pictorial she examined—those 
pictured were members of the Dai minority nationality, identifiable as such 
by the clearly visible tattooing on their bodies (Hood 2011: 84). According 
to Hyde (2007: 3), the situations in both Yunnan and Xinjiang reflects 
China's "racial dichotomy" that is centred on "the more nuanced and 
regionally rooted issue of Han and non-Han bodies." This racial dichotomy 
is important here as it was not ethnicity in isolation that led to high rates of 
HIV among Uyghurs—it was also due to the sociographic history of 
Uyghurs living under Chinese rule. These factors contributed to the perfect 
environment for HIV to explode among the Uyghur population.  
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International experience has repeatedly shown that it is the 
impoverished and the marginalised that are most vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. 
Within Xinjiang, the minority nationalities are one such group that fits this 
definition. International experience has also shown that in areas of 
widespread infection, HIV/AIDS epidemics can have a staggering impact on 
economic and developmental gains that have taken decades to achieve. 
However, most significantly for Xinjiang, international experience has also 
demonstrated that the most effective response to HIV/AIDS epidemics 
fuelled by IDU is to introduce needle exchange and methadone programs. 
Although IDU was the major source of HIV transmission in Xinjiang during 
the early years of its epidemic, rather than implementing clean needle and 
methadone programs, for many years Chinese IDUs were imprisoned upon 
detection in a misguided attempt at vice suppression (Wang 2000). While 
Xinjiang was no different to other parts of China and this crack down on 
drugs was the result of the drug laws introduced in 1990, the delay in 
implementing "behavioural pattern change" among IDUs, such as clean 
needles and methadone programs, caused Xinjiang's HIV/AIDS crisis to 
continue worsening.  
Widespread HIV transmission among IDUs was also aided by the 
Chinese government's effort in the mid-1990s to combat drug use and 
trafficking, known as the "Strike Hard" campaign (yanda). In Xinjiang, 
"Strike Hard" was primarily focused on shutting down unofficial political 
organisations, eliminating the threat of separatism and cracking down on 
drug trafficking (Dillon 2004: 84). While the campaign was successful in 
reducing the amount of heroin available on the market, it caused Uyghur 
heroin addicts to change their drug-taking practices due to the limited 
available supply of heroin. Instead of smoking heroin as they had previously 
done, they began to inject heroin (Hagt 2004). By the end of 1997, 50–80% 
of all drug users in Xinjiang were injecting drugs (UNAIDS 2002). This 
made their use of heroin far more addictive and there was a net increase in 
the number of drug users in Xinjiang (Rudelson 2003). The change also led 
to increased HIV vulnerability among IDUs due to high rates of needle and 
drug injecting equipment sharing among IDUs. Amendments to the 1979 
Drug Control Law also meant that from 1997 onwards, possession of more 
than 15 g of heroin could lead to jail terms of up to 15 years, or even the 
death penalty (Hagt 2004). This change saw IDUs go further underground, 
making it incredibly difficult to reach them with HIV awareness information 
and harm reduction strategies. This in turn heightened their vulnerability to 
HIV transmission through IDU. 
More recently however, Xinjiang has modified its stance towards 
preventing HIV among IDUs and in some areas is now focused on harm 
reduction models of HIV prevention. In 2008, it was reported that Xinjiang 
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had 81 professional organisations engaged in all levels of HIV/AIDS 
prevention and treatment across the region. In addition, it was reported that 
there were 138 stationary needle exchange centres, 3 mobile needle 
exchange vehicles as well as 25 community-based out-patient drug 
maintenance centres. The number of voluntary testing clinics had risen to 
422, and over 70,000 health professionals were receiving training on 
HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment (Kerim, cited in Li 2008).  
While the above figures demonstrate a significant political shift in 
China's response to IDUs in Xinjiang, the length of time it has taken to 
make this change can be questioned. HIV transmission through IDU was 
identified as a serious problem in Xinjiang in 1996. Just six years later, 
UNAIDS (2002: 24) reported that Xinjiang was one of the "more heavily 
affected provinces" and stated that Xinjiang had a "well-established HIV 
epidemic among its resident IDU populations." Considering it wasn't until 
much later that significant developments had been made in introducing 
clean needle and methadone programs, there has been a serious time lag in 
the response. This has undoubtedly caused significant numbers of IDUs to 
continue to contract HIV through needle and drug equipment sharing. 
According to Rudelson (2003), some "[n]ationalistic Uyghurs [have] viewed 
the government's lack of response to HIV/AIDS as a deliberate program of 
genocide [in Xinjiang]." However, if we consider China's overall response 
to HIV/AIDS, we see striking similarities between their nationwide 
response to HIV/AIDS and the response in Xinjiang, similarities which lend 
no credence to this kind of extreme view. 
According to Eberstadt (2002), Beijing's initial response to China's 
HIV/AIDS epidemic was largely peripheral and its political leaders long 
appeared to be in denial about the emerging HIV/AIDS epidemic within 
their borders. While the crisis was officially recognised in 2001 (Chan 2011; 
Gu and Renwick 2008), it was not until September 2002 that the central 
government in Beijing began to speak openly about the PRC's growing 
AIDS crisis, after a health report was leaked from the Henan Provincial 
Health Department (Gittings 2002).5 The report claimed that as many as 35 
to 45% of commercial blood and plasma donors in some areas of Henan 
Province had contracted HIV/AIDS as a result of inadequate safety 
precautions and that the Henan authorities had attempted to cover up their 
province's epidemic.6 The Henan leak was significant in drawing attention 
to China's emerging HIV/AIDS epidemic (Hayes 2005).  
                                                           
5
 The document was distributed on the Internet after it was obtained by AIDS activist Wan Yanhai. Wan 
was later arrested by Chinese state security in Beijing and detained for allegedly disclosing a "state 
secret" (Gittings 2002). 
6
 For more information see Hayes (2005).  
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Just prior to the Henan leak, another important information release 
forced the hands of the PRC government to be more responsive to 
HIV/AIDS. In June 2002, the United Nations Theme Group on HIV/AIDS 
in China (UNTGC) released a report titled HIV/AIDS: China's Titanic 
Peril.7 The report (UNAIDS 2002: 4) claimed the PRC was "on the brink of 
explosive HIV/AIDS epidemics" and that the Chinese government was 
focusing on the tip of the iceberg, hence the reference to the Titanic in the 
title of the report. The report stressed that Beijing was relying on unreliable 
and possibly understated figures on HIV transmission in China, rather than 
fully comprehending the enormity of the potential threat being posed by 
HIV/AIDS (ibid.). Due to the sheer size of the PRC and its population, it 
was also predicted that education and treatment campaigns would be made 
difficult. Complicating this further was that the report identified poverty, 
lack of knowledge and poor access to condoms, gender inequality, as well 
as the regional variations in transmission modes as factors that would also 
need to be tackled in order to effectively respond to the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. The report also identified the peculiar role that blood selling had 
played in transmitting the virus among the Han population in central China. 
The report did acknowledge that the Chinese government had made 
"significant progress" in preceding years in the development of HIV/AIDS 
regulations, policies and laws. However, it was highly critical of Beijing for 
their "insufficient" response to the rapid growth of HIV/AIDS infected 
persons in the PRC (ibid.: 4–5). While the PRC was a signatory to the Paris 
Declaration at the 1994 International AIDS Summit,8 the continued denial 
of the problem by Beijing was highlighted in the report as having hindered 
an effective AIDS response in China (ibid). Therefore, it was not only in 
Xinjiang that China's response to HIV/AIDS was slow and often lacking in 
political will and transparency.  
The "Titanic report" was important because it urged the PRC to make 
sweeping improvements to respond to its growing HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
Releasing the report also opened the discourse of HIV/AIDS in the PRC. 
The report was also significant because it directed international attention, 
particularly media attention, to the growing HIV/AIDS epidemic emerging 
in China. Therefore, the release of the "Titanic report" marks the point at 
which the central government of the PRC was forced to recognise that an 
adequate response to HIV/AIDS demanded transparent, open HIV/AIDS 
policies and campaigns, as well as greater civil society participation such as 
grassroots action guided by HIV/AIDS international non-governmental 
                                                           
7
 The U.N.'s HIV/AIDS: China’s Titanic Peril has become widely known by the shortened "Titanic 
report." Any reference to this report hereafter will be by the shortened title the "Titanic report." 
8
 The Paris Declaration was an agreement by signatories to control HIV/AIDS epidemics in their own 
countries as well as committing to the global control and prevention of HIV/AIDS (Wei 2000: 9–12). 
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organisations (INGOs) like the UN and the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) (Li et al. 2010).  
The revelations in the "Titanic report," coupled with international 
criticism of its mishandling of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) epidemic in 2002/2003, forced the Chinese government to become 
far more responsive to health crises within its borders. Chan (2011: 69) 
states that it wasn't until after the SARS crisis that the government began 
"playing a leadership role in combating HIV/AIDS." The reopening of its 
borders in the late 1970s marked the end of an era in which China could 
close itself off from external scrutiny. The appointment of Vice-Premier Wu 
Yi as health minister in 2003 was an important step by the central 
government. Her appointment contributed to a more open and transparent 
response to HIV/AIDS in China. The former health minister, Zhang 
Wenkang, had been stood down for his failure to adequately respond to the 
SARS crisis and for the attempted cover-up of both the virus and its origins 
in southern China. Therefore, Wu Yi's appointment heralded a greater 
openness on the part of the Chinese government in discussing health crises 
such as SARS and HIV/AIDS, and signalled that China had taken seriously 
international criticism over its lack of response to health crises (Park 2003: 
54). 
Therefore, the "Titanic report" was the point at which the 
government's hand was forced. Although there had been earlier reports such 
as China Responds to AIDS (1997), a joint report by the Ministry of Health, 
People's Republic of China and the UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS, the 
broader scope of the "Titanic report," and the sense of immediacy and alarm 
it embraced in its presentation of the facts and figures,9 caused the report to 
attract considerable attention. The report did cause shockwaves throughout 
Beijing and during fieldwork on HIV/AIDS in China in mid-2003 the author 
was told by HIV/AIDS specialists working for INGOs and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) that the political climate around 
HIV/AIDS had become extremely sensitive since the release of the "Titanic 
report" and as a result of the SARS debacle. Even so, there was recognition 
by the Chinese leadership that they had to respond more openly to 
HIV/AIDS and this involved allowing INGOs and NGOs to play a more 
prominent role in Chinese political and social life (Li et al. 2010). This is 
also when the most HIV preventative action began to occur; indeed, the 
author was surprised by the rapid increase of counter HIV/AIDS action 
post-2003.  
By this time however, the HIV/AIDS epidemic in China had been 
expanding with little hindrance since 1985. Like other countries, the pattern 
                                                           
9
 This sense of immediacy and alarm is demonstrated at the bottom of the introduction where there is a 
bolded statement in larger font.  It states "Now is the time to act!" (UNAIDS 2002: 7). 
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of HIV transmission in China can be divided into phases. During the first 
phase (1985–1988), the numbers of people infected with HIV were small 
and were primarily located in China's coastal cities. Those infected were 
usually foreigners living in China or Chinese citizens returning from periods 
spent abroad (Wang 2000). However, during this stage there were also a few 
cases of iatrogenic transmission.10 In Zhejiang Province, four people were 
infected after they were given imported blood products later determined to 
be infected with HIV (Xia 2004). 
In addition to continued infections among those living in the coastal 
cities, the second phase of transmission (1989–1993) saw new cases of HIV 
located largely among IDUs of Yunnan Province. In 1989, 146 IDUs in 
Yunnan tested positive to HIV. Yunnan's close proximity to the countries 
located in the "Golden Triangle" (Cambodia, Laos, Burma and Vietnam), 
which produce opium and heroin, and the province's own opium and heroin 
production meant that drugs were easily accessible and relatively cheap in 
this area. Therefore, many people became addicted to injection drugs and 
HIV/AIDS was easily transmitted in this region and among IDUs in 
neighbouring countries, because of high rates of sharing needles and 
injecting equipment. Thus, the diffusion period of HIV infection in China 
was very much centred on the transmission of HIV/AIDS through IDU 
(ibid.). However, HIV transmission during this stage was not solely 
restricted to IDU. Small numbers of infections were detected among 
prostitutes, STI patients and workers returning from overseas employment 
(Wang 2000). 
China's third phase of HIV was marked by the spread of HIV 
transmission beyond Yunnan Province. This phase began in 1995 and 
continues to the present day. This phase has seen a rapid increase of 
infections across all regions and provinces throughout China. There have 
also been more diverse transmission modes, including IDU, commercial 
sexual intercourse, men who have sex with men (MSM), commercial blood 
and plasma donation, iatrogenic transmission, non-commercial sexual 
contact and mother-to-child transmission (ibid.). 
Therefore, it was not only in Xinjiang that a rapid and appropriate 
response to HIV/AIDS was lacking. This was the case throughout all of 
China. According to UNAIDS (2002: 5), the situation in 2002 was dire, and 
this lack of action resulted from: 
Insufficient political commitment and leadership at many levels of 
government, insufficient openness when dealing with the epidemic, 
insufficient resources both human and financial, scarcity of effective 
                                                           
10
 Iatrogenic transmission refers to the transmission of HIV through medical treatments or therapies such 
as HIV contaminated blood transfusions, using syringes contaminated with HIV and exposure to 
HIV/AIDS through needle stick injuries. 
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policies, lack of an enabling policy environment, and poor 
governance. AIDS awareness remains low among the public and 
decision makers. Involvement by civil society and affected 
communities remains embryonic, while the overall AIDS response 
remains far too medical within a healthcare system in crisis.  
It is unsurprising then that Xinjiang and Yunnan experienced serious delays 
between the time AIDS epidemics were first detected there to when 
effective and adequate HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programs began 
to be introduced. They are both located on the periphery geographically and 
socially, and at the time even urban China was experiencing a lack of 
appropriate HIV/AIDS responses.   
 
EPIDEMIOLOGY OF HIV/AIDS IN XINJIANG 
In Xinjiang, HIV/AIDS was first detected in 1995 (Maimaiti et al. 2010; 
Zhang et al. 2007). One year later, a serious HIV/AIDS epidemic among 
IDUs was identified, followed by the detection of commercial sexual 
transmission of HIV in 1998 (UNAIDS 2002). Since these early discoveries, 
Xinjiang's HIV/AIDS epidemic has grown rapidly. According to some 
reports (Xia 2004:12; Renmin Ribao, cited in Hyde 2007: 51), while it took 
Yunnan 5–6 years to reach near-saturation infection rates among IDUs 
(70% or higher), in Xinjiang this process only took 2–3 years. The speed of 
transmission was largely the result of very high rates of needle and drug-
injecting equipment sharing among IDUs combined with little or no 
HIV/AIDS awareness. By 2007, 14 prefectures across Xinjiang were found 
to have PLWHA, with 24,818 confirmed HIV infections (Xinjiang Centre 
for Disease Control 2007).  
For many years, IDU was the primary mode of HIV transmission in 
Xinjiang. This is unsurprising when one considers Xinjiang's location along 
two of the world's largest heroin and opium drug trafficking routes, namely 
the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent. As mentioned above, the 
Golden Triangle is the name given to one of Asia's opium producing 
regions. The area forms a triangular shape and encompasses the 
mountainous regions of Burma, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The Golden 
Crescent is the name given the other opium producing region in Asia. This 
area encompasses the opium fields of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. The 
area received this name due to the crescent shape of the combined opium 
growing areas. Both drug trafficking routes see a significant amount of 
heroin and opium transported into Xinjiang annually
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1990s, led to increased Chinese government efforts to combat drug use and 
trafficking in Xinjiang as part of "Strike Hard" (Hagt 2004).  
Early surveys conducted in Ghulja and Ürümqi found HIV infection 
rates among IDUs were 84% and 39% (UNAIDS 2002). The most recent 
figures from the Ministry of Health of the People's Republic of China (2010: 
24) cite "high infection prevalence" among IDUs in Xinjiang, but they do 
not provide a percentage to demonstrate just how high this figure is. IDUs in 
Xinjiang are generally young adults, with the under 35 cohort accounting 
for approximately two-thirds of all users (Gill and Gang 2006). Needle and 
drug injecting equipment sharing in the region has been high, with early 
studies by the World Health Organisation (2001) reporting that 100 percent 
of IDUs shared equipment. While HIV/AIDS awareness has increased since 
the time of that study, the aforementioned high rates of HIV among IDUs 
demonstrate that HIV transmission through IDU is still a significant 
problem in Xinjiang.  
More recently however, the epidemic in Xinjiang has experienced 
some change and sexual transmission has also emerged as a leading mode of 
HIV transmission. There are now significant numbers of CSWs11 testing 
positive for HIV. Poor knowledge of HIV prevention is fuelling HIV 
transmission in commercial sexual exchanges. Reported rates of condom 
use in commercial sexual exchange are very low with studies by the 
Kashgar Center for Disease Control (2007) finding that up to 65% of sex 
workers in some locations did not use condoms with clients. A different 
study conducted in Aksu is equally alarming. It found that rates of condom 
use among sex workers operating in Aksu casino were as low as 20.9% 
(Aksu Prefecture Health Bureau 2007). Clearly, these low rates of condom 
use in commercial sexual exchange reflect that more needs to be done in the 
area of harm reduction among most-at-risk populations (MARPs) such as 
commercial sex workers. Often the low rates of condom usage reflect little 
awareness of the role of condoms in the prevention of HIV transmission 
(Hayes and Qarluq 2011).  
In addition to poor awareness, low rates of condom use could also be 
due to an inability to negotiate condom usage in the commercial sexual 
                                                           
11
 This information relates to female sex workers. Due to a lack of available information specific to 
Xinjiang, male sex workers and men who have sex with men (MSM) have not been included in the main 
discussion of this article. This is an area that urgently requires more research. In terms of a whole of 
China overview, in 2009 homosexual transmission of HIV accounted for 14.7% of new infections 
(UNAIDS 2010a). MSM are recognised by UNAIDS (2008) as a most-at-risk population (MARP), with 
70% of MSM having more than one sexual partner in the 6 month period prior to being interviewed. 
Alarmingly, only 30% of MSM surveyed by UNAIDS (2008) reported using condoms during anal sex. 
However, the 2009 figures demonstrate this had risen to 47.9% in some locations (UNAIDS 2010a). 
Between 38–50% percent of MSM use a condom when engaging in commercial homosexual intercourse 
(ibid.). MSM are also identified as a MARP requiring further epidemiological surveys in order to better 
design intervention models to reach them with harm reduction strategies.  
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exchange. The ability of the sex worker to negotiate condom use varies 
greatly depending on their location of work and their level of agency within 
the negotiation of the sexual exchange. More formalised brothels have 
greater power in insisting on condom use in the commercial sexual 
exchange and they are able to assist the sex worker if the client refuses. In 
addition, these venues often provide the condom so the cost is not borne by 
the commercial sex worker. These venues are also targeted by NGOs and 
INGOs for education campaigns on condom use and HIV/AIDS awareness. 
CSWs at the other end of the spectrum such as street workers, or those who 
work for pimps, often lack the support necessary to negotiate condom use 
and have to pay the cost of the condom themselves (Health specialist, 
international donor organisation, Beijing, 27 August 2003, pers. comm.). 
They are also noticeably absent from education campaigns on preventing 
sexually transmitted infections (STIs) such as HIV/AIDS. Furthermore, the 
commercial sexual exchange performed with a condom often involves a 
discount; the lower price combined with the additional cost of the condom 
often makes little economic sense to the CSW as it can significantly reduce 
the take-home rate of the sexual exchange (Hayes and Qarluq 2011). HIV 
transmission through CSW can lead to widespread transmission of HIV 
among the general population. It is therefore imperative that 100% condom 
use is promoted, especially in commercial sexual exchange.  
There is already evidence demonstrating that HIV/AIDS has begun to 
spread among Xinjiang's general population. Mother-to-child-transmission 
(MTCT), which was first detected in Xinjiang in 1996, is an important 
indicator of an HIV epidemic moving into the general population. Since 
2004, MTCT has reached, or in some areas, exceeded 1% (Gill and Gang 
2006; Qin et al. 2005). According to UNAIDS, MTCT rates in excess of 1% 
demonstrate that a HIV/AIDS epidemic meets the criteria for categorisation 
as a "generalised epidemic," meaning the epidemic has made significant 
inroads among the general population (Gill, Huang and Lu 2007). 
Therefore, the results from Xinjiang indicate that in some areas, the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic has most definitely moved into its growth period and 
HIV transmission is occurring among the general population. While the 
figures vary across Xinjiang, general estimates of MTCT of HIV across the 
region are 1.2% (Wu and Sullivan 2006). However, in Kashgar the 
prevalence of MTCT has reached 5.3% (Gill, Huang and Lu 2007). This 
figure is worrying because it could reasonably suggest that Kashgar's 
HIV/AIDS epidemic may be moving toward the rampant prevalence phase, 
whereby HIV/AIDS increases at an alarming rate among the general 
population. This would have a significant impact on the area, which already 
experiences difficult social and economic conditions.  
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Efforts to prevent MTCT (PMTCT) have increased all over China. 
Pilot programs on PMTCT have been launched in 271 counties across 28 
provinces and autonomous regions. PMTCT of HIV was one of the services 
provided by the Four Free and One Care (simian yiguanhuai) policy 
(National Center for AIDS/STD Prevention and Control 2006). In Xinjiang, 
there have been 81 clinics focused on the PMTCT of HIV established across 
the region (Li 2008). However, a study by Wang (2006) on the effectiveness 
of PMTCT programs in Ghulja has found that these clinics are making slow 
inroads in PMTCT due to a wide range of factors. These factors included 
low self-perceived risk of the mother, which prevented her from being 
tested. In addition, hospital management delays meant some women were 
only notified of their HIV positive status after they gave birth to their 
babies. This caused them to miss out on the preventative measures 
necessary prior to and immediately after birth such as caesarean delivery, 
anti-retroviral therapy and formula feeding rather than breastfeeding. It was 
also found that many pregnant HIV positive Uyghur women experienced 
stigma and discrimination by the health workers employed to assist them as 
well as from family members. A UNAIDS (2008: 34) report confirmed 
Wang's findings stating that "the quality of service delivery has room for 
improvement" and reported "weak management and poor integration with 
HIV interventions." The report recommended that better staff training and 
improved service integration with existing programs on HIV prevention 
were necessary in order to increase the coverage and quality of PMTCT 
services (ibid.).  
Migrant workers, or the "floating population," as they are known 
colloquially, are an important group who could cause an upsurge in HIV 
transmission among the general population in Xinjiang and in their home 
locales. In Xinjiang, this group of transient workers numbers in the vicinity 
of 600,000 and usually comprises young, sexually active people from low 
socio-economic backgrounds, generally from rural China. They have 
varying literacy rates ranging from basic literacy upwards and they 
generally travel to Xinjiang for the cotton-picking season before returning 
home. Migrant workers are particularly vulnerable to HIV transmission due 
to their age, combined with the long periods of separation from their family 
and loved ones. Their newly acquired disposable income means that many 
migrant workers participate in high risk behaviours such as IDU and 
commercial sexual exchange. Wu and Sullivan (2006: 92) report that 10–
50% of male migrant workers engage in high risk sexual activity, 
characterising these men as a "new threat to AIDS prevention and control." 
This is largely because they have the capacity to carry HIV into areas that 
have not previously been affected such as new work locales or their home 
villages on return visits. 
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Due to their poor literacy levels, migrant workers are also considered 
a MARP because they often lack appropriate HIV/AIDS prevention 
knowledge (ibid.). Furthermore, they can be missed by HIV educational 
campaigns due to their transient lifestyle. As a result, the floating population 
often become a "bridge" for the transmission of HIV to the general 
population (Gill and Gang 2006). However, recent awareness of their 
potential role in transmitting HIV widely has led to HIV/AIDS prevention 
information now being displayed on public billboards and some railways, 
bus stations, shipping ports and airports are now distributing HIV/AIDS 
awareness pamphlets. In some instances, transportation providers are also 
running educational activities aimed at increasing HIV awareness among 
their passengers. Some migrant worker training or vocational referral 
centres have also included increasing HIV awareness among the migrant 
workers as part of their service, and they play an important role in 
distributing pamphlets and other materials to migrant workers who use their 
services. Migrant cotton pickers are also provided with HIV awareness 
education on the trains to Xinjiang (UNAIDS 2008; Teng and Hu 2011). A 
recent study on similar programs in Wuhan reported there to be a 30% 
increase in AIDS literacy demonstrated in response to pre- and post-
program questionnaire results. Migrant workers have also indicated they 
would like AIDS information printed on the back of train tickets as it is less 
conspicuous and they can easily retain them for future reference (Li 2011). 
These educational campaigns are useful as they provide MARPs with harm 
reduction strategies which could significantly reduce the transmission of 
HIV in the future.  
However, in Xinjiang, many early education campaigns conducted 
locally in the region (not those targeting Han migrants to the region) were 
flawed as their Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials 
were often printed in the Chinese language only. For Uyghur CSWs and 
IDUs for example, many of whom have basic or next to no Chinese 
language skills; these important IEC materials were useless and completely 
ineffective in reaching out to Uyghur MARPs, leaving them vulnerable to 
continued HIV transmission. In 2008, UNAIDS (2008: 33) described the 
overall lack of linguistically appropriate materials as "unsatisfactory" and 
reported that the government's challenge from here on in would be "to 
design and implement more effective IEC interventions that relate to the 
target audience, reach focal populations and bring about desired attitude 
changes among the target group." One of the key reasons for this oversight 
was the noticeable absence of Uyghur staff employed in the local 
HIV/AIDS prevention and control facilities or programs.   
Things are slowly changing however, and linguistically appropriate 
IEC materials are now on the increase in Xinjiang. A number of advocacy 
IJAPS, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January 2012), 77–102 Anna Hayes
 
 94 
programs by the State Council AIDS Working Committee Office 
(SCAWCO) are now printing IEC materials in minority languages including 
Uyghur language. There have also been bilingual (Uyghur and Chinese 
language) HIV awareness radio broadcasts via 90 receiver stations across 
Xinjiang (UNAIDS 2010b). In addition to this, the State Ethnic Affairs 
Commission has begun producing video information programs in minority 
languages and UNAIDS has encouraged wider involvement of ethnic affairs 
networks into Xinjiang's overall HIV prevention strategies. Faith-based 
organisations are also now involved in HIV prevention strategies in 
Xinjiang, providing both support networks and HIV awareness (UNAIDS 
2008; Wheeler et al. 2007).  
Imams are influential community leaders in Xinjiang and can be 
pivotal players in changing not only community attitudes but also 
influencing public health and government policy. A recent pilot project 
implemented in the Tianshan district of Ürümqi reported significant 
outcomes. Public health messages were linked to the Koran and Imams 
underwent training to improve their HIV/AIDS awareness. Those who 
participated in the project reported they had greater understanding of 
HIV/AIDS, they felt more comfortable in counselling people within their 
community on HIV/AIDS and their understanding of the impact of 
HIV/AIDS on PLWHA and the community had deepened. The Imams now 
have greater authority to engage in HIV prevention efforts within their 
community and methodologies for this type of capacity-building training for 
Imams is now being incorporated into training modules offered by the 
Islamic Association and the Religious Affairs Bureau (Wheeler et al. 2007). 
This is a significant improvement in China's approach to preventing further 
transmission of HIV/AIDS in Xinjiang, and it is encouraging to see greater 
civil society involvement. 
 
 
HIV/AIDS, ETHNICITY AND THE CHINESE PERIPHERY  
 
If we return to Rudelson's aforementioned comment that HIV/AIDS has 
been viewed by some more radical Uyghurs as a deliberate program of 
genocide, it is worthwhile to again note that China's overall response to 
HIV/AIDS lacked initiative and action. Xinjiang was not the only area 
where HIV transmission was able to spread unchecked. Throughout China, 
large-scale HIV prevention campaigns were not implemented until many 
years after the epidemic emerged. However, it is easy to see why such a 
view could arise. Considering that China's HIV/AIDS epidemic was 
concentrated primarily among the minority nationalities in Yunnan and 
Xinjiang in the early years, and that there was a lack of decisive action to 
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prevent its transmission, perhaps this inaction could be linked to the 
ethnicity of those infected. On the other hand if this were so, what about the 
epidemic among blood sellers in Henan? This epidemic was concentrated 
among Han Chinese, and government action in that province was also slow 
in coming. Does this then demonstrate inaction across the board regardless 
of ethnicity?  
Hood has argued that HIV positive people in China are similar to the 
minority nationalities because they become what she referred to as the 
"AIDS minority" (Aizu) (2005: 23). This is an important observation 
because it highlights adverse discrimination based on HIV status. Therefore, 
the ethnicity of the aforementioned Han Chinese AIDS victims in Henan 
was supplanted symbolically by their newly acquired "AIDS minority" 
identity. This relegated HIV positive Han Chinese to the periphery of 
Chinese society, a position generally occupied by the minority nationalities, 
people exhibiting anti-social behaviour or those existing on the fringe of 
society like IDUs and CSWs. This could have been a contributing factor to 
the insufficient political commitment and leadership that existed at the time. 
Perhaps this relegation was due to the initial official discourse on AIDS by 
Chinese authorities. They described AIDS as an "evil from abroad," and 
asserted that the "superior immune system" of the Chinese, combined with 
their "Neo-Confucian values," would mean that HIV/AIDS would not infect 
the general population (Dikötter 1997: 78–79). Instead, they claimed it 
would largely remain limited to homosexual men and CSWs who serviced 
foreign clients, in addition to the minority nationalities (ibid.). It was even 
initially described in the 1990s as Aizibing—the "loving capitalism disease," 
indicating its perceived link to the foreign, capitalist outsider (Gu and 
Renwick 2008: 93). 
Such beliefs became accepted by Chinese society and have influenced 
how both the virus and PLWHA were perceived. These views have 
continued to resonate among some sections of Chinese society. This was 
exemplified in many conversations the author had with everyday people in 
Beijing, such as street vendors and taxi drivers.12 One notable conversation 
the author had in 2003 makes the above point quite well. After the author 
explained to a possible informant why she was in China conducting field 
work investigations into HIV/AIDS there, he responded by saying "AIDS is 
not a problem in China unlike in the west where you come from" (Art seller, 
Beijing, 20 August 2003, pers. comm.). After some discussion that there 
were some cases of HIV in China the informant revised his position stating 
"[o]h yes, maybe in the south of China, among the minority nationalities. 
                                                           
12
 As part of her methodology the author employed Schein's "itinerant ethnography" as a means of 
gathering information relevant to her research.  This method utilises "shopping [and] incidental 
conversations on trains and buses…" as a primary means of information gathering (Schein 2000: 28).  
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But not here" (ibid). This account reflects Hood's findings. She states early 
state media portrayals of HIV/AIDS were centred on the foreign "other" or 
those on the periphery such as minority nationalities and traditional high 
risk groups like CSWs and MSM. This has affected how the Chinese view 
the disease and their own (low) self-perceived risk of contracting it (Hood 
2011: 178).   
In her examination of the cultural politics of HIV/AIDS, Hyde (2007: 
25) states that "[i]n China's borderlands, the public health bureaucracy 
began to first address the epidemic and then to blame the minority 
inhabitants for its spread." In addition, she states that HIV "is also very 
much a disease of moral and geographic imaginations" (ibid: 27). This also 
speaks to Hood's observations that PLWHA have been transported from the 
centre of Chinese society to its periphery due to their HIV positive status. 
However, this author proposes that unlike the ethnic minorities, those 
belonging to the AIDS minority can still escape their minority position if 
their HIV status remains undisclosed.   
For Uyghurs (and other minority nationalities), there is no escape. 
They will continue to occupy the Chinese periphery, geographically and 
socially, for the foreseeable future. They, like other minority nationalities, 
have been considered a people on the margins whose cultural, religious, 
economic and political aspirations run counter to the Chinese government's 
notion of a multi-ethnic unified society. Furthermore, years of government 
attempts at assimilation or integration have not yet succeeded. Instead, they 
have been fiercely resisted at times. Xinjiang is still challenged by 
separatism and ethnic instability as was most recently seen in the July 2009 
race riots in Ürümqi and the July 2011 attacks in Kashgar and Khotan. It is 
an environment dominated by the racial dichotomy of Han and non-Han. 
More importantly, as the Uyghur majority feel more insecure about their 
position in a region with seemingly ever-increasing numbers of Han 
Chinese, attempts to cling to their differences, the things that make them 
ethnically different to Han Chinese will likely become ever-more forceful. 
However, HIV/AIDS will become an important fight for them into the 
future if the epidemic keeps expanding. McMillen (2009: 18) concludes that 
HIV/AIDS is an important issue that needs to be factored into "any 
assessment concerning the future of [Xinjiang]."  
Rudelson and Jankowiak summarise the HIV/AIDS factor brilliantly 
in their discussion of Uyghur acculturation and resistance. They conclude 
that HIV/AIDS "overwhelms their [Uyghur] battles over identity and turns 
those battles into a struggle for their communal survival" (Rudelson and 
Jankowiak 2004: 319). This author concurs with their findings. HIV/AIDS 
is posing a serious threat to the minority nationalities in Xinjiang, 
particularly the Uyghurs. The initial government delay in adequately 
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responding to the increasing HIV/AIDS epidemic in Xinjiang has caused 
some Uyghurs to level blame and criticism at the government. When 
combined with historical, political and ethnic tensions in the region, as well 
as the unfulfilled goal of real "autonomy" either within, or outside of, the 
Chinese state, the situation in Xinjiang appears dire. With each new HIV 
case, these tensions will continue to mount and may lead to stronger 
resistance as survival becomes the fundamental goal. Therefore, HIV/AIDS 
poses a serious "ill" in Xinjiang—both in terms of health security and 
regional stability.      
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Thus the political, economic and social status quo between Han Chinese and 
the minority nationalities in Xinjiang is an uneasy one.  Han Chinese 
domination of regional affairs has contributed to marginalisation of minority 
nationalities and growing social instability, both of which deepen 
vulnerability to HIV. It is therefore not surprising that Xinjiang is 
experiencing an HIV/AIDS epidemic primarily affecting the minority 
nationalities. In addition, years of HIV prevention mismanagement, 
sometimes including the omission of minority nationalities from the scope 
of regional HIV prevention campaigns, has caused groups such as the 
Uyghurs to be distrustful of the government. Should cultural, religious and 
linguistically appropriate HIV/AIDS prevention strategies not be scaled up 
and widely implemented throughout all of Xinjiang, further discontent 
among Xinjiang's minority nationalities will surface.  
Thus, the HIV/AIDS epidemic is an important dynamic in the region 
and it could emerge as the single most important issue if the epidemic 
reaches pandemic proportions. Greater autonomy is necessary for Xinjiang, 
for without it we shall see continued resistance to Chinese rule, and race 
riots like those which occurred in 2009 and 2011 could become a more 
frequently occurring event. China's grand plan for a unified multi-ethnic 
state is only possible if Han dominance is removed, and the minority 
nationalities are provided greater educational, economic and political 
opportunities for self-determination. The region's majority population 
cannot be overlooked and Han Chinese cannot continue to be the primary 
beneficiaries of government development in the region. The increasing 
numbers of Han migrants to the region is untenable because it fuels the 
racial dichotomy between Han and non-Han. It also forces minority 
nationality assimilation into the dominant Han culture, and is increasing the 
marginalisation of minority nationalities. These factors also make the 
collective Uyghur identity more pronounced and possibly more radicalised, 
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as Uyghurs emphasise and assert ethnic differences in order to increase their 
agency and power. Clearly, concerted governmental and non-governmental 
action is not all that is needed to reverse current HIV trends in Xinjiang. 
Allowing greater autonomy in the region is also necessary. This will see the 
minority nationalities become a stronger and more integrated part of the 
internal social, political and economic infrastructure of the region and it will 
allow them to have a greater voice in determining Xinjiang’s future within 
the Chinese state, rather than causing them to desire a future outside of it.  
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